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Economics, Foreign Policy, and United
States-Japanese Trade Disputes
I. Introduction: Economics and Foreign Policy
The most essential ingredients of foreign policy today are economic.
This has been true for several decades, and increasingly is being
recognized.
In a report prepared for the recent presidential transition, the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (a respected Washington
think tank) asserted that "there is consensus about the need to place
special emphasis. . .on international economics because of [its]
increased importance . . . for a successful foreign policy. Thus [this
report] has revised the classic notion of 'national security' to ensure
inclusion of the economic ... dimensions of international affairs .... I
The report's chapter on "International Economic Policy" begins by
asserting that "the importance of integrating international economic
policy with other aspects of U.S. international involvement has become
critical." 2 This illustrates how economics has become the dominant
area of concern in foreign policy.
U.S. relations with Japan are discussed almost exclusively in eco-
nomic terms. Furthermore, most of those discussions are characterized
by a great deal of animosity toward Japan. I want to urge that we con-
sider our relations with Japan in a much broader context than simply an
economic one, though of course without underplaying the importance
of economic relations. I want to urge also that we discuss our economic
relations with Japan in a friendly, not a hostile, manner, though of
course without underplaying the importance of the differences between
US.
* Former Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, United States Department of
State; now Research Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research. These remarks are based on a Keynote Address delivered at the Cornell
International Law Journal Symposium, "The United States-Japanese Trade
Relationship: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 1990s, February 24, 1989,
Ithaca, NY.
1. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSI-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1 (Nov. 10, 1988).
2. Id. at 42.
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II. Japan in the International Community
Japan is already a major power and is destined to grow in importance for
at least the next century. It has become the world's second largest econ-
omy, an economic superpower, and is beginning to play a role commen-
surate with that status.
Until recently Japan kept a low profile in international affairs, sel-
dom taking the lead and usually following our lead. In Japan, as in Ger-
many, there remains (especially among educated people), a deep-seated
sense of guilt and shame for the period from 1930 to 1945. The
Germans, however, have more readily resumed their place in world
affairs. This is perhaps explained in part by the fact that the Germans
are active in a number of international organizations-for example, the
European Economic Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. Furthermore, the German place in world affairs had been estab-
lished for centuries, whereas Japan began to participate only within this
century. Germany also has close geographic, cultural, and historical ties
with other leading powers, and people of German ancestry have long
been included among the elites of North and South America, as well as
Europe. Finally, many Japanese, especially of the generation now pass-
ing from the scene, have deep feelings of gratitude, obligation, and
admiration toward America as a result of the way we behaved as con-
querors-notjust because of the atrocities we did not commit, but more
from the political, economic, and social enlightenment to which we
guided them.
All of these factors cause Japan to attach far greater weight to its
relations with the United States than to its relations with any other coun-
try. The historical, geographical, and political factors are strongly rein-
forced by economic factors: not only are we the largest source of their
imports and the largest market for their exports, but we are their main
external intellectual resource for management, science, technology, and
engineering.
It is revealing to contrast the Japanese and German responses dur-
ing the period two or three years ago when the U.S. began urging both
countries to stimulate their economies. The U.S. sought to reduce its
trade deficits with these two nations. Whether this action in turn would
benefit Japan and Germany depended on what stimulative measures
they used stimulate the economy. The results of fiscal and monetary
measures would be fairly prompt, but they would be inflationary. The
results of structural adjustments-reducing rigidities, reforming taxes,
reducing regulations, opening competition, etc.-would be delayed, but
beneficial. The Japanese initiated both fiscal and structural changes,
and made a point of informing the U.S. of their plans and progress. The
Germans suggested that we buzz off, or go fly a kite. (Both theJapanese
and German economies seem to have benefitted from these opposite
responses, but our trade balance has not.)
Vol. 22
1989 Keynote Address
M. United States Interests in the Pacific
Even though economics dominates our current relations with Japan, we
must never forget that we have major, growing interests in the Pacific,
and that Japan is the most important nation in the Pacific.
The most dynamic economies of the world are in the Pacific-not
only the four "newly industrialized economies" ("NIEs"),3 but also
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are waiting in the wings. Australia is
already a very significant friend and ally; it has a strong and growing
economy, and brings constructive good sense to world affairs. Within
the U.S., the five Pacific states may some day be our most important
region.
In recent years, the Soviets have been increasingly active in the
Pacific. At Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, they have one of the world's
greatest naval bases. Of their four fleets, the largest is in the Pacific,
amply supplied with ballistic missiles. The Soviets fish extensively in the
South Pacific, both literally and figuratively. In many of the islands, such
as Fiji, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea, settlers out-
number the indigenous population and dominate democratic elections,
thereby creating fertile soil for political unrest. (Even Libya has stirred
the pot a little in Vanuatu.) In the Philippines, the communist insur-
gency continues; demagoguery has a good chance of forcing out our
bases; and the long-run stability of the government is uncertain.
In short, we have important political, security, and economic inter-
ests in the Pacific, and we need friends there. Australia is our best and
most trusted friend and ally in the South Pacific; Japan plays the same
role in the North Pacific. There are serious economic issues between us
and Japan. It is important that we resolve those issues, and no less
important to us than to Japan that we resolve them in ways that build
mutual confidence and friendship.
IV. The United States and Japan in a Multilateral Context
Unfortunately, in international trade the United States has a reputation
for arrogance and bully-boy behavior. We say we want fair trade. Who
could object to that? But who defines "fair trade?" We do, unilaterally;
and too often what we mean by "fair trade" is only that trade in which
we sell and others buy. We charge unfairness, we pass judgment and we
impose penalties-again unilaterally. We're the biggest, so we can get
away with it. This "American Unilateralism" in trade, however, is uni-
versally resented. That resentment affects all aspects of our interna-
tional relations.
In our defense, it must be recognized that internationally recog-
nized rules of trade are few and feeble; enforcement of those rules is
almost nonexistent. In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), not only does it take forever to deal with charges of viola-
3. Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea.
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tion, but the defendant can veto a guilty verdict. In such circumstances,
occasional resort to frontier law is hardly surprising.
It is critically important for the future of the world trade that the
Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations be completed on schedule by
1990; that it establish workable rules for trade in agricultural services,
intellectual property, and trade related to investments; and that it create
an effective means of resolving disputes. The United States and Japan
were prime movers in launching the Uruguay Round. The Europeans,
especially France, were the main obstructionists, and in the current
negotiations they are blocking efforts to abolish subsidies that distort
trade in agriculture over a ten-year period.
V. The Bilateral Trade Relationship: The United States and Japan
Turning specifically to trade relations between the U.S. and Japan, sev-
eral important issues dominate the debate.
A. The Trade Deficit
The size of our trade deficit with Japan is not important economically.
Obviously it is of great importance to journalists and politicians.
Through them it has acquired great symbolic importance to most lay-
men and businessmen, in the same way that feeding hormones to beef
cattle has acquired real psychological significance in Europe. But it is
only a "dagger of the mind, a false creation."
The trade balance with any single country does not matter. We
should expect to have deficits with some countries and surpluses with
others. Even the aggregate trade balance has little economic signifi-
cance. Trade in goods is only part of the economic intercourse between
countries. The total flow of considerations is always equal in both direc-
tions. If a country has a large trade deficit, as does the United States,
then it has an equally large surplus in its capital flow. In fact, the trade
deficit is essentially equal to the amount by which investment in the
United States exceeds the amount saved in the United States.4 The
United States remains the best place in the world to invest, and the
amount of American money invested abroad is far exceeded by the
amount of foreign money invested here.5 In sum, our trade deficit has
little to do with either our competitiveness or the trade barriers of
others.
B. Japanese Barriers to Trade
It follows from the first point that trade barriers in Japan do not have
much effect on the size of our trade deficit with Japan. In fact, Japan has
been lowering its trade barriers. It is almost the only major country to
4. Conversely, Japan's trade surplus equals the amount by which savings in
Japan exceed the amount invested there.
5. Those who claim, erroneously, that the United States is a debtor nation do so
partly by regarding all foreign funds invested here as money owed by Americans.
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do so; we have been raising ours. Yet despite lower formal barriers to
trade, our trade deficit with Japan has risen. Japan's trade barriers
might more accurately be called "impediments," since with the excep-
tion of agriculture, Japan has low tariffs and few quotas. These impedi-
ments, however, are detrimental to the United States because they
seriously distort the composition of our exports to Japan. They prevent
the United States from concentrating on products where we have the
greatest comparative advantage, and limit us to exporting those items
which, while advantageous, are not the most advantageous.
C. The Inefficiency of Japan's Economy
The impediments to the U.S. achieving maximum advantage from trade
chiefly result from the fact that Japan's economy is astonishingly ineffi-
cient. The gains to Japan itself from removing the impediments that
restrict us would far exceed the gains to the United States.
Japan's export sector success has created the illusion of a miracu-
lously efficient economy. Notwithstanding that popular image, however,
much of the Japanese economy is backward and inefficient. It is ironic
thatJapan, which in its foreign trade has been so effective in directing its
resources and talents into the most productive areas, has not allowed
the same kind of efficiencies to operate in its domestic sector. Consider
some illustrative examples.
America's farmers are five times as productive as Japan's and could
provide food to Japanese consumers at a much lower cost. In many
cases quotas and high tariffs prevent them from doing so. Rice is a bul-
wark of theJapanese diet, yet rice sells in Japan for approximately seven
times the world price. Soybeans also sell for about seven times the
world price. Because an inefficient sector is protected, the Japanese
consumer suffers, as does the Japanese economy as a whole. But we in
the United States, and other countries with comparative advantages in
agriculture, suffer also since we are unable to make the most of our
advantages.
Japan buys logs from the U.S., but if our sawmills, which are much
more efficient than Japan's, process those logs into plywood or paper,
Japan levies a high tariff on them. The result is that Japanese houses
and furniture are excessively expensive. Every time anyone in Japan
puts pen to paper or remodels his house, he is subsidizing an inefficient
industry. Again,Japan prevents the United States from making the most
of our efficiency, which would otherwise benefit both the U.S. and Japan.
Japan's cumbersome distribution system increases the price and
decreases the availability of goods, especially imported goods. More-
over, Japan's retailing law limits the size of stores, and can prevent a
larger retailer from providing a greater variety of goods at a lower price.
When industries in Japan become depressed,Japan subsidizes them
by providing specific tax benefits and loan guarantees. It also protects a
number of them by cartels which bar lower-priced imports. Today,
twenty-two industries inJapan-most of them in basic materials such as
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petrochemicals, fertilizers, paper, textiles, and aluminum-are classified
as depressed. Industrial users are forced to buy the more expensive
products of inefficient domestic industries.
Even aside from these cartels, many Japanese companies prefer to
buy products made by companies in their own "groups" with which they
have been doing business for many years. Part of the reason for this has
to do with the nature of Japanese society. But the result is that outsid-
ers, whether foreigners or Japanese, are excluded. This prevents the
end-user from obtaining the best product at the best price. Though this
practice has not been unknown in our own country, deregulation, inten-
sified competition, take-over threats, and foreign imports have reduced
it to insignificance.
Finally, Japan's surplus savings have been moving overseas. Many
old-line industries are able to block competitors who would invest the
savings in modernizing the industry, and this has limited opportunities
for investing Japan's large savings in Japan.
D. Japanese Investment in the United States
Japanese investments in the United States are very much to the United
States' advantage. This is one respect in which Japanese inefficiencies
work to our advantage.
As indicated above,6 Japan's balance of payments surplus is essen-
tially equal to the excess of its domestic savings over its investment. Its
savings are large, but because its economy (except for export industries)
is generally inefficient, only part of those savings is invested in Japan. A
large part of the savings is invested abroad, especialy in the U.S. Thus,
Japanese saving provides us with capital that makes our labor, our man-
agement, our natural resources and our technology more productive,
rather than benefitting Japan.
E. Domestic Political Influence
The politics of trade issues are very much the same in Japan-or, for
that matter, in any democracy-as in the United States. Why, for exam-
ple, did the Japanese put up so much resistance to opening their citrus
market? Why did the U.S. campaign so aggressively to open the Japa-
nese citrus market? The answer to both questions is the same. In both
countries, a comparatively small group of producers was in a politically
strategic position that gave it great leverage with the party in power.
What are called international economic issues are mostly domestic polit-
ical issues; they result from efforts of small groups to gain unearned
advantages from other groups in the same country.
F. Maintaining Good Will
We have brought strong and unrelenting pressure on Japan to lift
impediments to trade in one area after another. In virtually every
6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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instance, eventually, Japan has gone a long way toward meeting our
objectives. But, with the possible exception of semiconductors, the
steps taken have been at least as beneficial to Japan as to us. Market
openings that we have achieved have been equally available to all coun-
tries (except probably for semiconductors). These openings have dis-
criminated in our favor only in the sense that the impediments we have
attacked may have been more important to us than to others. We have
made better progress in opening markets in Japan than in almost any
other country, and we must keep in mind the limits on Japan's fund of
goodwill toward the United States. We must not overdraw that account.
The United States's stake in future U.S.-Japanese relations is just as
great as Japan's.
VI. Conclusion
We have an important stake in the Pacific, and fortunately have strong
and friendly ties with the two most important countries in the Pacific,
Australia and Japan. With Japan we have serious problems arising pri-
marily from impediments that limit our exports of the products where
our greatest comparative advantage lies. Those impediments are more
damaging to Japan than to us, and many Japanese recognize that. The
obstacles to lowering the impediments arise from the power of special
interests-the "tyranny of minorities"-that characterizes democracies,
perhaps all governments. Indeed, much of the pressure on Japan to
open its markets arises from special interests in the United States.
Opening Japan's markets would be beneficial to both Japan and the
United States. Competent officials should, therefore, be able to work
together in a spirit of goodwill, and with understanding of each other's
domestic politics, to advance our common interest in freer, more pro-
ductive trade.

